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REFLECTIONS OF A STATE REVIEWING COURT JUDGE UPON THE
SUPREME COURT'S MANDATES IN CRIMINAL CASES
CHARLES S. DESMOND*
When commonly used police practices as to con-
fessions and searches were found by our highest
court to be in conflict with the basic constitutional
rights of citizens, the predictable results were
loud emotional outbursts from two groups of ex-
tremists. There was highest praise of the Court's
holdings and strongest denunciation, hosannas
as at the dawn of an awaited Bill of Rights
milennium, and doleful despair and predictions of
complete collapse of safety and of society. The din
has now subsided, at least for the moment, and so
the time is right for unemotional appraisal and
adjustment.
Let us go at once to what I consider the prime
point. The police forces of America are in imme-
diate need of better training and counsel, first, as to
how, when and where confessions can be taken so
as to be permitted in evidence; and, second, as to
what ground rules must be obeyed in order to
make a no-warrant search, or one backed up by a
search warrant, valid under the Mapp rule, so as
to allow in evidence proof about fruits of the search.
This urgent necessity for more intensive criminal
evidence training for police officers explains, I
suppose, the name and purpose of Northwestern
University Law School's new "Police Legal Ad-
visor Program", of which this meeting is a part.
But looming up behind these most urgent demands
is a societal need of highest priority-the need
everywhere in America, but especially in the
smaller communities, to improve the status, pay,
training and procedures of the police, including
where necessary the consolidation of rural police
forces into larger organizations and the provision of
state-wide highway controls and mobile, highly
trained, special investigative groups. Until the
American public and its leaders are ready with the
resources and supply necessary to accomplish these
improvements, present efforts to explain the new
constitutional concepts and to adjust to them will
be but temporary expedients awaiting a better
day.
Now, as to confessions, let me start with a ques-
tion to which I can give no answer: Are we moving
* Chief judge of the Court of Appeals of New York.
toward a rule of constitutional law which will pro-
hibit the taking of incriminating statements from a
suspect or at least prohibit doing so without first
instructing the suspect as to his right to counsel
and other protections?
In 1936 the United States Supreme Court for the
first time, in Brown v. Mississippi,' held that state
procedures as to the admissibility of confessions
claimed to be involuntary were subject to review
by the Supreme Court as regards federal due proc-
ess. In 1948, in Watts v. Indiava,2 it was made clear
that voluntariness was the test. Since that time, in
innumerable state and federal decisions,3 there has
been developed a growing list of elements of in-
voluntariness, such as delay in bringing a suspect
to court, refusing to let him see his lawyer, pro-
longed or otherwise onerous questioning, threats,
promises of leniency, status of the suspect as to
youth, illness, mental weakness, failure to under-
stand the language, coercion by fear, physical tor-
ture, lack of food or sleep, plus the taking of a
confession after a prosecution has commenced.
In more recent times the confession rule and the
privilege against self-incrimination tend to merge
into one. The dissent of Justice White in Escobedo
v. Illinois,4 suggests that the majority decision in
that case is another step toward the goal of barring
from evidence "all admissions obtained from an
individual suspected of crime whether involun-
tarily made or not". The majority Escobedo opinion
does not go that far, but holds a confession inad-
missible where taken after a police investigation
had ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and had focused on a particular suspect who
then confessed while in police custody after having
been refused an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer. This, the court held, was a denial of the
assistance of counsel and thus violative of the
sixth and fourteenth amendments.
Escobedo cited People v. Donovan,5 where the
1297 U.S. 278 (1936).
2338 U.S. 49 (1948).
3 For the "new look" see Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963).
4 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628 (1963).
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Court of Appeals of New York held inadmissible a
confession obtained during a period of detention
prior to indictment and after an attorney retained
for the suspect had requested and been denied ac-
cess to him. Just before Escobedo, the Supreme
Court had decided the Massiah case,6 where, adopt-
ing the views of a concurring minority in Spano,
7
the Court held that eavesdropping on an indicted
defendant who had retained a lawyer rendered
inadmissible the incriminating statements thus
obtained. Since Escobedo, California's highest
court, in People v. Dorado,s has said that any con-
fession taken without notifying the suspect of his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
counsel is inadmissible as evidence. In 1964, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Hargraves,9
refused to go so far, holding that the suspect need
not be notified, but that his lawyer must be sum-
moned if he demands one". The Supreme Court of
the United States has denied certiorari in both
Dorado and Hartgraves.
The narrower meaning of Escobedo in this con-
nection has been followed in about 18 states but
such check as I have been able to make suggests
that a number of Federal courts, including the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals," several United
States District Courts, and the courts of Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island and Nebraska have given
the broadest possible meaning to Escobedo. New
York has refused to go to that length but has in
effect ruled (as in Donovan, supra, and People v.
Failla,12 and People v. Sanchez,13 that there is no
obligation on the police questioners to tell the sus-
pect that he has the right to counsel, but that if the
suspect demands counsel and the demand is re-
fused, or if counsel is available but barred from
consultation with his client, a confession thereafter
obtained cannot be used in court.
In some of the state courts, particularly in New
York, there has been much litigation on the ques-
tion of whether a confession is rendered inadmis-
sible because it is obtained after criminal proceed-
ings have in some manner commenced. The New
York cases seem to have gone furthest in holding
that whenever such proceedings have commenced
6 377 U.S. 207 (1964).
7 360 U.S. 315 (1959).8 42 Cal. Reptr. 169, 398 P. 2d 361 (1965).
9 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. 2d 33 (1964).
10 See also People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y. 2d 248, 212
N.E. 2d 533 (1965).
11 United States ex rel Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.
2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
12 14 N.Y. 2d 178, 199 N.F. 2d 366 (1964).
13 15 N.Y. 2d 387, 207 N.E. 2d 356 (1965).
against the accused any incriminating statements
made thereafter by him are inadmissible as a
matter of law14.
The United States Supreme Court (as I read
Hamilton v. Alabama,1 and White v. Maryland)16
has not moved beyond the holding that failure to
furnish counsel at a preliminary hearing in court
makes incriminating statements there obtained
inadmissible if the offense be a capital one or a very
serious crime, and if the failure to have counsel was
in fact prejudicial. In reading the cases on this par-
ticular subject we must note that the word "ar-
raignment" is used in two different senses-in New
York, for instance, it includes a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate while elsewhere it seems to
mean the court appearance at which a defendant is
required to plead to an indictment. An interesting
query: is a confession inadmissible if obtained
through deception, as distinguished from force,
fear or promises? 7
The real conflict, of course, is between the sus-
pect's right to remain silent and the prosecutor's
right to know, between the state's burden of pro-
tecting the suspect and the public's right to the
truth. How and when these conflicts will be re-
solved I do not know. I do know that the sugges-
tions as to holding these examinations in the pres-
ence of a judicial officer are at least 50 years old in
this country.
Let me mention briefly two other problems re-
lated to confessions. Theoretically it is possible to
prove that a suspect under questioning has effec-
tively waived the right to have counsel and our
court has recently so held, 6 at least with respect to
an experienced and sophisticated law breaker, even
after court proceedings had commenced. Such an
alleged waiver, however, will always remain sub-
ject to the closest scrutiny.
The other incidental matter I mention is the
difficult one of handling a situation where two or
more defendants are tried jointly and a confession
of one, naming the other defendants, is offered in
evidence. It is surely not satisfactory for the court
to instruct the jury to ignore these references to
14 See People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y. 2d 544, 166 N.E. 2d
825 (1960); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y. 2d 561, 175
N.E. 2d 445 (1961); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y. 2d 162,
182 N.E. 2d 103 (1962).
15 368 U.S 52 (1961).
16 373 U.S. 58 (1963).
17 See People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. 2d 553
(1951); People v. Everett, 10 N.Y. 2d 500, 180 N.E. 2d
556 (1962).1 People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y. 2d 275, 213 N.E. 2d 441
(1966).
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non-confessing defendants, and it is not much
better to eliminate those references. The situation
is a dangerous and difficult one and may in the
end make joint trials themselves illegal.19
As to the use in court of evidence obtained by
illegal searches and seizures, here, too, there is a
collision between the court decisions and the prag-
matic demands of every day law enforcement. As a
matter of logic and legal reasoning, the special
difficulty I find with Mapp is that it writes into the
fourth amendment an unexpressed sanction by way
of exclusion of evidence and it does this not because
the fourth amendment so commands but because
the courts could find no other way of policing the
police. The Supreme Court carefully and de-
liberately weighed the law enforcers' arguments
against the man's-home-is-man's castle concept
and accepted the latter. That answer is not going to
be changed and must be accepted. It does have the
everyday practical effect, however, just as do the
new confession rules, of depriving the public, not
just the prosecutors and the police, of reliable, con-
vincing real evidence. And, again speaking practi-
cally and realistically, the Mapp rule does not pro-
vide any protection for the ordinary average citizen
who never needs it. What the rule does is to im-
munize or safeguard the professional criminal, es-
pecially the narcotic dealer and the gambler. I
cannot forget that my own state of New York got
along for decades with Judge Cardozo's old Defore
rule: that illegality of method of obtaining evidence
was no bar to its use in court. Now, having de-
livered myself of these outdated strictures I turn
to a brief discussion of the legal questions which
Mapp is generating for the state courts.
Some of these, I think, express no more than a
reluctance of police officers, especially in states like
New York, to accept the new necessity for obtain-
ing search warrants. Many of the close and difficult
cases my own court has struggled with need not
have arisen at all since one officer could have stood
guard at the premises while another rushed down
and obtained a search warrant. Here, as in the con-
fusion about confessions, we need first of all an
upgraded, better instructed, more professional
police establishment. The times cry out for better-
paid and better-led police forces, for centralization
of scattered isolated local police, for development
in every part of every state of highly mobile
cadres of trained investigators. Policemen, with all
19 See Della Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957).
the help we can give them, must relearn their jobs
so as to live with the Mapp rule and the emerging
confession rules.
Other Mapp-created problems will be solved, I
predict, by use of a less technical approach by the
courts to search warrants and the affidavits sup-
porting them. After all, the purpose of the require-
ment that before a valid search there must be a
judicial writ is to interpose between the police and
the citizen the protective scrutiny of an impartial
judicial officer. Fully to accomplish that purpose
there need be exhibited to the magistrate only so
much sworn proof as should convince a reasonable
mind that there is reasonable ground for the search
and that the search is for specific objects, not a
general hunt for possibly existing, undescribed evi-
dence of criminality. To the magistrates and other
warrant-issuing judges the appellate decisions
should make this as dear as words can make it.
Common sense should mark out the right path
between hyper-technical construction of these
affidavits as if they were ancient common law
pleadings and, on the other side, the rubber-
stamping of affidavits by a compliant judge.
I think, too, that the police need further and
more explicit instructions from their legal advisers
and from the courts as to the meaning and applica-
tion of the exceptions that have been written into
the fourth amendment-that is, the validation of
searches without warrant when incident to lawful
arrests. While the validation of such searches is an
interpretation of the word "unreasonable" in the
fourth amendment, it is still essentially an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement and so is quite
strictly construed and cautiously applied by the
courts. It follows that a warrantless search and
seizure may be validated only when in the strictest
sense it is incidental to an arrest, and, furthermore,
the arrest itself must be a lawful one. Police officers
must be carefully instructed that "incidental" to
the arrest means contemporaneous in time and
identical as to place, not merely "incidental" in
the loose sense of "relating to" or "occasioned
by".
A word should be said about disclosure of the
identity of informers in litigated searches and
seizures. The general rule is that when a defendant
tries to invalidate a search warrant the prosecutor
need not reveal the name of an informant unless (in
the case of a search warrant) the informant exe-
cuted the supporting affidavit, or in any case where
the informant was himself a participant in or an
19661
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eyewitness to the alleged criminal episode or where
the informant's tale is the only evidence to estab-
lish the legality of the search, or where for some
other reason a fair trial for the defendant requires
disclosure. But that disclosure is still the exception
and is rarely ordered by the courts 2 .
As to confessions, probably the only sure things
are: first, that the police can no longer assume the
right to shut a suspect away from the outside
world until they have finished questioning him;
and, second, that there are situations and circum-
stances which require the police to let the man
under questioning consult his lawyer. Almost
everything else about the right to counsel during
questioning is at this moment to be seen only
through a glass darkly.
I join with some of the academic writers in this
observation or prediction: since the Supreme Court
has held that one who has a lawyer available must
be allowed to consult him when the questioning
reaches the accusatory stage, then fair play and
20 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957);
Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P. 2d 39
(1958); People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y. 2d 443, 191 N.E.
2d 236 (1963); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y. 2d 86, 204
N. E. 2d 188 (1965).
equal protection will dictate a holding that one
who does not have a lawyer handy, or does not
know he may use one, will have to be told of his
rights and provided with counsel.2 '
Another reckless prediction of mine: that the in-
creasing emphasis on the constitutional status of
the right to privacy, the right to be let alone, the
right against invasion of one's exclusive premises,
will inevitably make wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping unconstitutional except perhaps in cases
where the national interest itself is involved, and
then under proper safeguards.
"Repetitio est mater studiorum" is an ancient
Jesuit educational motto which, very loosely trans-
lated, means that to make your point you must
repeat it over and over. So I end where I began,
with the statement born of many years of dealing
with criminal cases and especially of coping with
the mid-twentieth century revolution in the con-
stitutional law of evidence, that instead of wring-
ing our hands we should roll up our sleeves and go
now to work modernizing and educating our police.
21 Since this paper was presented the Supreme Court
has so held in Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)
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